We are not building
an aircraft company.
We are building
short-haul aerial logistics.
The 300-600 km cargo corridor moves on trucks that take 12-24 hours. There is no air option for 100-300 kg payloads at this range. The gap is not a market inefficiency. It is a structural absence, and the technology to fill it exists today. We are engineering the purpose-built vehicle for that gap, step by step, with every risk identified and a specific answer for each one.
Same-day delivery to tier 2/3 cities is physically impossible by road at 500 km. Offshore platforms pay helicopter rates for cargo runs under 500 km because no cheaper option exists. The Indian Navy ships supplies by boat. None of these operators are waiting for a better product, they are waiting for any product that works at this weight and this range.
LogiXair is engineering the L560 to fill this gap precisely: 300 kg payload, 600 km range, VTOL from a 7m × 5m footprint, hybrid-electric, modular cargo bays. Every one of these parameters was chosen to eliminate a specific failure mode. They are the minimum set required to make the product work for the customer who needs it.
Supply chains are becoming smaller, faster, and more distributed.
The cargo mix is changing. The network geography is changing. The infrastructure is not.
Cargo is shifting from bulk-only movement toward frequent, high-value, time-critical shipments: spares, electronics, medical cargo, sensors and production inputs.
Customers now expect hours, not days, for critical regional movement. Trucking remains exposed to congestion, terrain, weather and handoff delays.
Manufacturing, energy assets, warehouses, ports, defence units and Tier 2/3 demand are spreading beyond airport-centric logistics networks.
Middle-mile logistics is still infrastructure-bound.
Supply chains are becoming more distributed, but cargo movement still depends on slow roads, centralised airports, fixed hubs and expensive special-purpose transport.
Modern supply chains need frequent movement of medium-payload cargo: industrial spares, electronics, medical cargo, samples, tools, offshore supplies and B2B replenishment.
Warehouses, factories, ports, offshore assets, defence locations and regional demand centres are spreading beyond airport-centric logistics networks.
Roads are slow, airports are centralised, helicopters are expensive and small drones do not carry meaningful middle-mile payloads.
Five decisions that define the L560. Every one was made to serve the logistics mission, not to optimise aircraft performance metrics. The alternative in each case would produce a technically interesting aircraft that fails commercially. These are logistics decisions that happen to be expressed as engineering constraints.
The commercial opportunity lives at 300-600 km. Not shorter. Not longer.
Sub-300 km truck routes take 4-6 hours. Operators tolerate this. The freight economics do not support the cost of aerial delivery for that time saving. Over 600 km, commercial air freight via airports already works. The gap, where trucks take 12-24 hours, airports are absent, and freight urgency is real. That corridor is precisely 300-600 km.
A logistics operator running a 500 km route cannot offer same-day delivery to tier 2/3 cities. The road takes 16 hours. The L560 takes 2.5. That time difference is the product. It unlocks a $50B+ commerce segment that is currently blocked by physics, not by price.
We did not choose this range because it is achievable. We chose it because it is where customers are paying a premium for an inferior solution and will pay more for a better one.
16-hour routes become 2.5 hours.
VTOL is not an aircraft feature. It is how we access the logistics market.
Every warehouse operator, offshore platform, naval dockyard, and remote industrial site in the target market shares one characteristic: there is no runway on site. A fixed-wing aircraft capable of 600 km range requires a 300 m prepared strip at minimum. This disqualifies it from every target customer site before the commercial conversation begins.
The 7m × 5m operating footprint of the L560 is the size of two parking bays. It is designed to land where the cargo already is, not to require the customer to build infrastructure for it. Any warehouse with a loading yard is already a launchpad. Any offshore platform deck with 35 sqm of clearance is already a landing pad.
VTOL is not the differentiator. It is the minimum condition for market access. We did not make it a selling point. We made it a constraint.
No runway. No prepared pad. No new infrastructure.
The logistics opportunity opens at 300 km. Getting there requires hybrid.
Battery-only VTOL at 300 kg payload delivers approximately 80 km of useful range under good conditions. The commercial opportunity opens at 300 km. The gap between 80 km and 300 km is not a product roadmap problem. It is an energy density problem, and no battery chemistry on a commercially relevant timeline closes it.
A hybrid-electric system with a fuel-agnostic generator closes the gap today. The battery handles VTOL: takeoff, hover, and landing, where power density is critical. The generator handles cruise, where energy density is critical. The powertrain runs on jet-A, SAF, or biofuel, which means it works wherever fuel already exists. Every offshore platform, every logistics hub, and every naval base already has fuel. We are not asking for new infrastructure.
We are building hybrid-electric as the correct architecture for this payload class and this decade. The energy density numbers for batteries do not support our mission profile, and they will not for the foreseeable future. We designed for the physics that exist, not for the physics we would prefer.
The gap is 520 km. No battery closes it.
Defence first. The logistics customer with the lowest certification barrier and the highest urgency.
Full commercial type certification takes 3-5 years. A programme that cannot generate revenue until certification closes is a programme that burns capital with no validation and no proof of market. The correct entry point is where the certification requirement is lightest, and that is defence and expeditionary logistics.
Defence and government contracts require no commercial aviation certification. They run on NCNC agreements and operator-specific airworthiness approvals. The Indian Navy ship-to-shore pilot, expeditionary resupply, and humanitarian logistics operations can begin in the first 18 months. Revenue from these operations validates the technology in real conditions and generates the operational data that feeds every subsequent certification argument.
Offshore follows at months 18-24, moderate airworthiness requirements, a high-value use case, and customers already paying helicopter rates. Middle-mile is last, at months 24-30, because it requires full commercial type certification. It is the largest market. Each stage funds the next and builds the evidence for the one after it.
Prove early. Certify in parallel. Scale with advantage.
→ Middle Mile
18-24M: Moderate airworthiness
24-30M: Full certification · Largest market
One platform, every logistics vertical. Modularity is what makes the unit economics work.
Pharmaceutical cold chain from Hyderabad to Tier 2 cities, dry e-commerce from fulfilment centres, offshore maintenance kits for wind farm operators, and defence supply for naval forward positions each have different physical containment requirements. A fixed-bay aircraft serves one of these and forecloses the others. A platform with one cargo type running one shift per day cannot justify the economics of a programme of this scale.
The L560 cargo bay is modular: click-on, click-off, standardised to ISO/EU pallets, swappable in under 10 minutes, loadable directly from trucks. The same platform serves cold-chain pharmaceutical in the morning, industrial spares in the afternoon, and offshore maintenance kits the next day. Full-day cross-vertical utilisation is what makes the logistics unit economics work. A fixed-bay aircraft locked to one cargo type runs the asset at a fraction of its revenue potential.
The modular bay interface is patented. The automated swapping dock eliminates the specialist ground crew requirement. The cargo tracking is integrated at the bay level. The operator plugs in the bay type they need and dispatches.
One airframe. Full-day utilisation.
Each phase answers one engineering question. We do not begin the next phase until the current one has produced physical evidence, not simulation results or design reviews. Each phase is designed to stand alone commercially if required and hands a proven result to the next.
| P0 Winghead |
P1 First flight |
P2 Defence pilots |
P3 Offshore + commercial scale |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Timing | May - Oct 2026 | Nov 2026 - Aug 2027 | Sep 2027 - Mar 2028 [0-18M pilots] |
Apr 2028 → [18-30M transition + scale] |
| Question answered | Does the hybrid powertrain transition through the tilt-wing cycle without failure? | Does the complete L560 fly 300 kg across 600 km, VTOL from 7m × 5m? | Can we generate revenue with zero commercial certification? Does the technology survive real operations? | Can we move from defence pilots through offshore to middle-mile commercial scale? |
| Why this question first | The tilt-wing transition is the single highest technical risk. A failure here ends the programme. We prove it before building the full airframe, not after. | Once propulsion is proven, we integrate the full aircraft and prove the mission. Lab conditions are not enough. We need flight data. | Defence requires no commercial certification. Fast deployment on NCNC terms. This is the earliest point we can generate real revenue with real validation, before any airworthiness filing. | Defence ops (0-18M) fund and prove. Offshore (18-24M) transitions under moderate airworthiness. Middle-mile (24-30M) scales with full certification advantage. |
| Physical deliverable | Winghead assembled, ground-tested, transition cycle validated | Full mission profile flown: 300 kg, 600 km, VTOL demonstrated | Defence pilots are live, with Indian Navy ship-to-shore operations running. First revenue is logged and the offshore airworthiness filing is initiated. | Offshore routes are revenue-positive and the commercial certification is filed. Middle-mile routes are operational, with 10+ routes and the fleet deployed. |
| Risk removed | "Can the propulsion and transition work?" | "Can the aircraft perform the full mission?" | "Does the platform work in real defence operations with no commercial certification buffer?" | "Do route economics scale across all three verticals simultaneously?" |
| Supply chain | Ad-hoc. Fraunhofer composite work starts. | Fraunhofer + Honeywell fully engaged. Vendors identified. | Vendors locked. Assembly documented. Pre-production batch. | Multi-vendor, cost-optimised. Production logic in place. |
| COGS position | Not relevant | R&D spend | Defence pilots: contract pricing Offshore: $300-500 / flight |
Middle-mile: $150-300 / flight Target operating cost |
| Revenue | None | Pilot programme covers demo ops | Defence contracts: no certification premium. Offshore: margin-positive vs helicopter. | Middle-mile route economics proven at fleet scale |
| Funded by | $3.75M seed, covers P0 and P1 in full | Series A | Series A / B | |
Before this raise closes, the following risks have already been eliminated or substantially reduced. This is not a projection. This is the current state of the programme.
These risks are real. We are not dismissing them. We are showing the specific engineering answer for each one, and the sequence in which we prove each answer with hardware, not analysis.
De-risking entry. Building toward scale. Every sector runs on logistics. One system, multiple markets. Aviation-grade certification as a strategic moat.
→ 2-3hr
Every competitor is building an aircraft. We are building a logistics service. That distinction shapes every design decision. An aircraft company optimises for performance metrics. A logistics company optimises for route economics, customer access, and operational reliability. The slot is open because no one else has approached it as a logistics problem first.
| Dimension | LogiXair L560 | Drone OEMs sub-30 kg |
Cargo VTOL Elroy, Pipistrel |
Fixed-wing cargo Dronamics, Pyka |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trade-off made | None in the target gap | Payload, too light for freight economics | Range or geography, outside India/SEA | VTOL, runway needed, disqualified from target sites |
| Payload | 300 kg | <30 kg | 136-300 kg | 180-350 kg |
| Range at payload | 600 km | <30 km | 300-480 km | 320-2,500 km |
| VTOL, no runway | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ runway required |
| Operating footprint | 7m × 5m | <2m | 6-12m | Runway 300-1,300 ft |
| Modular cargo bay | ✓ patented | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| India / SEA primary market | ✓ | Fragmented | ✗ US/EU | ✗ |
| Certification track | EASA + DGCA active | Varies | FAA / EASA | FAA / EASA |
We will have cargo moving between pincodes before the road operators finish their feasibility study.
Raising $3.75M seed to fund P0 and P1 in full. $1.75M for L560 R&D. $2.0M for product development and certification readiness. 24-month runway to full mission profile flown, first logistics revenue at ₹0.1/kg/km, and certification filing initiated.
The gap is structural. The engineering decisions are locked. Fraunhofer and Honeywell are active partners, not prospective ones. A logistics operator has signed an LOI before the aircraft exists. The Indian Navy is in active discussion. The only remaining variable is how fast we build.